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As nations continue to explore space, the desire to reduce costs will continue to grow. As
a method of cost reduction, transporting and/or use of launch system components as integral
components of missions may become more commonplace in the future. There have been
numerous scenarios written for using launch vehicle components (primarily space shuttle
used external tanks) as part of flight missions or future habitats. Future studies for possible
uses of launch vehicle upper stages might include asteroid diverter using gravity orbital
perturbation, orbiting station component, raw material at an outpost, and kinetic impactor.
The LCROSS (Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite) mission was conceived as a
low-cost means of determining whether water exists at the polar regions of the moon.
Manifested as a secondary payload with the LRO (Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter)
spacecraft aboard an Atlas V launch vehicle, LCROSS guided its spent Centaur Earth
Departure Upper Stage (EDUS) into the lunar crater Cabeus , as a kinetic impactor. This
paper describes some of the challenges that the LCROSS project encountered in planning,
designing, launching with and carrying the Centaur upper stage to the moon.
I. Introduction
THE primary objective of the Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) mission was to
advance the Vision for Space Exploration by determining the possible existence of water ice at the lunar poles.
Locating sources of water has numerous implications for future missions to the moon. The LCROSS concept
originated when the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) switched to a larger launch vehicle having launch
capacity sufficient for a secondary payload. LCROSS was selected from a number of proposals to occupy this extra
capacity in part due to innovative use of the Centaur upper stage as a primary impactor, and the judicious use of the
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Secondary Payload Adaptor (ESPA) ring. The ESPA was originally
designed to carry six separate small satellites between the Atlas Centaur upper stage and the primary mission
payload (e.g. LRO) 1,2 . For the LCROSS mission, the ESPA ring was used for the shepherding spacecraft’s primary
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structure with the science payload and spacecraft subsystem panels attached externally to it, while retaining its LRO
launch adaptor and load bearing function 3 . The project was managed, partially developed and operated from NASA
Ames Research Center (ARC), and the LCROSS spacecraft was designed, built and tested at Northrop Grumman.
The Centaur upper stage, developed by United Launch Alliance (ULA), is designed for payload orbital insertions
and not for extended operations in space.
LCROSS launched with LRO on June 18, 2009, and on October 9, 2009, after 112 days in flight, both the
Centaur upper stage and LCROSS shepherding spacecraft (S-S/C) completed the mission by impacting the moon on
target in the crater Cabeus. The mission demonstrated a unique capability by transporting and successfully guiding
the Centaur to impact a permanently shadowed crater at the lunar south pole. After the Centaur impact, the S-S/C
followed, collecting imagery and spectra of the Centaur impact debris plume for evidence of ice and water vapor,
and impacting itself, four minutes later. After one month of post-impact analysis, the LCROSS science team
announced a positive identification of water on the floor of the Cabeus crater 4. LCROSS’s use of the 2300 kg spent
upper stage Centaur as a primary kinetic impactor, rather than the more typical use of the spacecraft itself for this
purpose, and carrying it for the duration of the mission presented new and unique challenges for the project. The
success of LCROSS demonstrated the capability to effectively use a launch system component as an integral part of
a short, science mission. The following sections describe the mission briefly and detail some of the unique features
this mission was required to accommodate while flying with the Centaur upper stage.
II. Launch, Mission and Requirements
LCROSS and LRO launched aboard an Atlas V launch vehicle in the 401 configuration (4-meter fairing, no solid
rocket boosters, and a hydrogen/oxygen burning single-engine, Centaur upper stage). After the Atlas/Centaur
separation (launch plus 4 minutes,
 8 seconds), the Centaur performed a 9 minute, 40 second main engine burn
achieving low-Earth orbit, followed by a 23
minute coast. The Centaur then performed a	 FairingMetp	 (4 er,Dia)i^
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Figure 1. Atlas, Centaur and LRO/LCROSS launch stack
commands left LCROSS still under Centaur attitude control. After initial power-up, the Centaur oriented the
LCROSS solar array toward the sun to maintain power and thermal control. Then, triggered by the completion of
Centaur venting procedures, the Centaur initiated a seventh and final discrete command to signal its release of
attitude control to LCROSS. The end of the Centaur’s primary mission occurred 32 minutes later, even though it
sent beneficial tank telemetry to the ground for an additional 5 hours.
The LCROSS mission was focused on achieving a precise, high-energy Centaur impact within a lunar polar
crater, and observing the impact and resulting ejecta plume from the S-S/C and a combination of orbiting and Earth-
based assets. To achieve the desired impact geometry, LCROSS performed a lunar gravity assist to transfer from its
trans-lunar orbit to a Lunar Gravity Assist Lunar Return Orbit (LGALRO), an elliptical, Earth-centered orbit of
roughly lunar semi-major axis, but inclined steeply with respect to the lunar orbit plane (Figure 2). Performing a
series of trajectory correction maneuvers (TCM’s) with the Centaur impactor still attached, the S-S/C gradually
refined the trajectory to hit the targeted crater. Following three revolutions of the Earth, th e LCROSS and lunar
orbits re-intersected. Less than ten hours before impact, the S-S/C released the Centaur and performed a braking
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maneuver to induce a four-minute delay between the Centaur and S-S/C impacts. This four-minute period allowed
the S-S/C to capture and transmit science data
from the Centaur impact event before impacting
itself and creating a secondary impact plume for
possible observation by earth and orbiting
resources.
The following project requirements were
important factors in guiding spacecraft, launch
system and mission operations designs, and are
provided here to assist understanding of the
following sections.
1) LCROSS will strive to measure the
concentration of water in the ejecta
cloud, as a ratio of water ice to regolith,
to a level as low as 0.5% by mass, and to
determine the form of which the water
may be in.
2) LCROSS shall distinguish water carried
by the impactor from water
 present on
the moon or provide confidence that any
residual water from the impactor is	 Figure 2. LCROSS flight path and orbit inclination
scientifically insignificant for lunar
water detection.
3) The Launch System shall vent the H 2 and O2 tanks to limit the remaining combined mass of those species
to no more than 100 kg.
4) The Launch System shall provide the following technical data to support LCROSS design and operations
development: a) EDUS Dynamics model; b) Outgassing estimates/reports; c) Venting timeline and
accounting of H2 , O2, H2O, He,N 2H4 remaining in Launch System upper stage lines/tanks; d) Accounting of
H2 , O2, H2O contained/absorbed in Launch System upper stage structure/insulation/components.
III. Centaur Test and Flight Design
Prior to flight, a number of unique design, analysis, test and flight procedure development activities were
required of the launch system provider (ULA) for the project to successfully transport and use the Centaur upper
stage on this mission. A typical Centaur mission is on the order of hours, and as the LCROSS/Centaur mission was
on the order of 110 days, several risks were identified by the team that were related to the greatly extended mission.
Physical modification to the Centaur vehicle consisted of painting the Centaur white for better thermal balance and
modeling. Of the numerous requirements placed on ULA by the project, the most significant derived from science
contamination constraints placed on the mission. As described in the previous section, requirements were developed
to eliminate contamination of the lunar impact site by the impactor itself. ULA analyses and tests were performed to
better understand Centaur propellant valve performance, tank depletion rates , and to estimate the quantity of water
that might be entrained in the Centaur insulating foam after liftoff
 . These included Centaur Tank Pressure Control
Analysis, which was a thermal control analysis to provide maximum predicted steady-state temperature of vapor
mass in the tank after LCROSS handoff. ULA analysis also estimated that approximately 1 kg of water may have
been trapped in the Centaur
 foam, half of which could be boiled off when the Centaur cold-side was exposed to the
Sun. The other half would be baked out during normal mission cruise (solar panel side exposed to sun). Per ULA
analysis, 90% of this trapped water would bake out within one hour of sun exposure. Another unique analysis and
set of tests were conducted to quantify the total weight of water entrained in the paint on the Centaur. Results
confirmed low water mass in the paint. Unique ULA flight software product development included a Centaur
propellant tank blowdown (post-blowdown sequence), designed to ensure O 2 , H2 and helium pressure reduction for
minimal venting after LCROSS handoff. An additional Solenoid Vent Valve operation was added late in the design
to improve the amount of gas expelled during this procedure. Software adjustments and tests were performed on this
Centaur propellant tank blowdown sequence to additionally balance tank pressurization and venting, and again
minimize post handoff venting. Onboard Centaur processing controlled all Centaur maneuvering, initiated the LRO
separation, and issued discrete commands that triggered LCROSS activation. The following is a list of designed
nominal propellant depletion maneuvers for both the cryogenic main engine propellants and pressurants, and
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hydrazine-based reaction control systems (RCS). Actual event timing differed as some events were activity driven.
Launch relative timing and locations of LCROSS discrete signals are included as a reference:
1) Attitude change and impulsive blow down (L + —61 minutes, continuing to L+73 minutes).
2) Non impulsive spin for RCS Hydrazine depletion burn for —46 minutes (L + —77 minutes).
3) Hydrazine non-impulsive burn off for — 7 minutes (L + —110 minutes).
4) Guided main engine hydrazine burn, (L + —126 minutes).
5) Issue LCROSS discrete signals #1 - #6 (L + —132 minutes).
6) Hydrazine final depletion, (L + —189 minutes).
7) Issue LCROSS discrete signal #7 to handoff control, (at Hydrazine depletion).
After launch, Centaur ‘end of mission’ and control handoff to LCROSS, ULA engineering teams continued
monitoring Centaur tank pressure and temperature telemetry for five hours beyond what would be considered for a
normal launch. These additional data were used to refine estimates of propellant depletion and to predict subsequent
residual valve leakage, important to the prediction of LCROSS propellant used to maintain attitude control (see next
section). One final analysis item the ULA team addressed was structural dynamics of an empty Centaur. The
concern was that Centaur structure, being empty after blowdown, could flex during TCMs, affecting the accuracy of
those burns. Analysis was performed for an empty Centaur to show that the structure was rigid enough to survive
and not affect planned maneuvers.
Whereas a good discussion of these and other efforts performed by ULA, and not mentioned here, is beyond the
scope of this paper, it should be noted that many of the efforts to accommodate LCROSS mission requirements from
the launch provider perspective were unique and significant. Future projects of this nature are advised to budget
sufficient time and resources to conduct early and frequent interactions with the launch vehicle provider to define
and mitigate unique and unexpected requirements that may never have been imposed on previous missions.
IV. Spacecraft Maneuver and Attitude Control Design
Transporting and then releasing the Centaur upper stage as part of the LCROSS mission created unique
spacecraft attitude control system (ACS) design challenges. Two distinct ACS gain sets were required, one set for
mass properties of an attached Centaur configuration (most of mission), and one for operating the S-S/C alone
following Centaur separation (for the last 9.5 hours of the mission). It should be noted that this was not simply a
matter of designing two different controller gains. The required effort is similar to designing controllers for two
different spacecraft because it entails the gain synthesis, stability analysis, simulations and flight software
development for cruise, maneuvering, delta-V, pointing, and safe modes for two drastic ally different configurations.
The more than a factor of 5 reduction in mass, nearly a 4 meter shift in the longitudinal location of the center of
mass, and approximately a factor of 200 reduction in transverse moments of inertia without attendant change in
thruster size or locations delineate the configuration challenges that had to be addressed and which were solved by
judicious thruster placement and alignment, an d careful propellant budgeting. Also, the mission operations team had
to provide and test commanding products, prepare contingency procedures, and run simulations of operationally-
relevant scenarios with various combinations of both gain sets. Impacting this process was a question of whether the
Centaur c.g. could be affected by the success of the blowdown. This question and the fact that the Centaur was
nearly symmetric about the LCROSS Y and Z coordinates,
 caused an overlap in Y and Z c.g. error estimates,
making it difficult to know which axis was the principal one. This was important for selected contingency analysis.
Creative solutions to configuration-related problems were called for and whereas their detailed description is
beyond the scope of this paper, it is ill ustrative to mention two examples. The first was the problem of the large sun
sensor blind spot created by the attached Centaur. This problem was circumvented by orienting the S-S/C’s coarse
sun sensors and modifying their processing algorithms to assure that, as part of a safe mode contingency, the
combined vehicle could find and point its solar array at the sun from any attitude. The second arose in considering
the operations and contingencies for Centaur separation. The high control-authority gains used when the Centaur
was attached had the potential to drive the S-S/C unstable if used when detached. Alternatively, premature
transition to S-S/C only gains without successful separation may have led to sluggish attitude control because
controller gains for the separated configuration would have been insufficient to hold the attitude of the unseparated
vehicle. Careful designs, numerous simulations, unhindered communications between Northrop Grumman and
NASA teams, and many hours of rehearsals were ultimately the tools for finding creative solutions to these
challenges. Future projects incorporating separation events with significant mass properties changes during the
mission should anticipate the amount of design and operations effort required.
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V. Centaur Venting
Analysis of Centaur components provided by ULA before launch exposed a potential for residual propellants to
leak from one or more valves on the spent stage for weeks or even months following launch. Even after the Centaur
performed propellant depletion activities in the first few hours after launch, the propellant control valve states could
not be determined or controlled and hence any residual fuel remaining could vent and induce torques on the S-S/C
and Centaur system. This generated a significant risk for LCROSS. Whereas these valves perform well for the
launch and orbit maneuver activities, they were not designed for 100% closure after the Centaur’s task is completed
(not a system requirement and not previously needed). Reliably predicting the amount of S-S/C propellant needed to
counteract venting disturbance was difficult because of the uncertainty in the magnitude of the leak rate, the
direction that the escaping gasses would take (depending on number of valves open, their location, and effective
thrust parameters including leak vector), and the decay time associated with such a leak. Because of these
uncertainties, in the weeks immediately prior to launch, the analysis proceeded to bound the problem by considering
four constant leak rates with a direction chosen to produce disturbance torques predominantly about the LCROSS X-
body axis. In this direction, the LCROSS attitude control thrusters had the least control authority and would
therefore expend the largest amount of propellant to counteract the Centaur venting. The predicted severity of this
effect depended on expected leak rate. Among the admissible set of leak rates, the low range at 800 sccm (Standard
Cubic Centimeter per Minute) represented the most severe consequences because analysis suggested this type of
leak would cause a moderate disturbance torque that would persist for much of the mission. Under slow and
moderate leak rates, analysis showed that the nominal control mode designed for the cruise portion of the mission
(lasting on the order of 100 days) would consume all the propellant (305.5 kg launch load) before completing the
mission. Very high leak rates would empty the Centaur tanks more quickly, and hence have a smaller overall effect.
Note in all cases, the assessment was for the worst-case set of Centaur valves (the valves causing torques about the
X-axis). Leaks from different valves would yield less severe results)
The LCROSS project developed a number of operational strategies for assessing leak severity and two alternate
modes of operating the vehicle to counteract leak effects. Through analysis and simulations, it was shown that
adapting the cruise control gains to work with increased thruster pulse width (50ms to 100 ms), which increased the
low duty cycle efficiency of the pulses, and by changing the thruster selection logic to fire thruster pairs instead of
quads, a factor of 2 savings could be realized in counteracting the leak disturbance. Although a considerable
improvement, this higher efficiency stellar inertial mode by itself was not considered sufficient to preserve the
mission if leak rates greater than 800 sccm were encountered early on. To provide mitigation under such
circumstances another approach was investigated, which entailed spinning the vehicle about its axis of maximum
inertia with the solar array (vehicle –Y body axis) pointed at the sun. This high efficiency sun pointed mode relied
on the dynamic stiffening and disturbance torque averaging offered by spinning the vehicle about its maximum
principle axis and using the thrusters only to maintain the spin rate. Its application in flight, however, remained
dubious because of unfavorable LCROSS mass properties. From the as-built mass properties estimates, at control
handoff the LCROSS Y-axis moment of inertia was estimated as 74,330.2 (+/- 226.4) kg-m^2, whereas the Z-axis
inertia was estimated as 73,996.1 (+/-226.4) kg-m^2. Even with the most favorable allocation of the uncertainties,
the Y-axis was therefore the major axis of inertia by only 1.1%. This margin was too small given the attendant fuel
slosh, structural flexing, etc., to assure that the spin condition once induced on the vehicle would preserve a spin
about the desired axis and assure a power and thermally safe configuration. LCROSS launched with this risk, but
with a reasonable expectation that actual Centaur leak behavior would be far less than predicted by worst-case
analyses. It should be noted that these efforts expended significant resources from many groups at a time when
launch preparations and operations tests were in progress. Furthermore, at the LPRP program level, the risk posed
by potential Centaur leak rates influenced the decision to slip the LRO/LCROSS launch from the June 2 launch
block (with high delta-v requirement, and hence low propellant margin) to the June 17 launch block (higher
propellant margin; included 6/17, 18 & 19). Under expected leak conditions, and with the above strategies
available, LCROSS showed a very good probability of torque mitigation and propellant margin for the June 17
launch window.
Hours into flight, the mission operations team assessed the severity of Centaur leaks using three methods. It
performed a series of disturbance torque assessments by observing the spacecraft attitude with control disabled;
observed the deadbanding behavior while under attitude control; and measured propellant usage due to active
attitude control. These proved invaluable in characterizing the magnitude, direction, and temporal characteristics of
the net torque. Figure 3 shows the results from torque observations collected 19.5 and 26.5 hours after launch with
thruster control inactive. Comparing the two, the yaw torque values decreased by 35%, and roll torques diminished
to nearly zero. Mission operations concluded within the first 2 days of the mission that remaining Centaur gasses
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were inducing only a moderate torque on the combined stack, and since the estimates of the net disturbance tracked
closely with the estimated propellant consumption rate, it was evident it was evident that propellant use to
counteract the
propellant
venting was not
going to
jeopardize the
mission.
LCROSS
exhibited a peak
propellant usage
of
approximately
6.5	 kg/day	 Swhile in cruise
at the beginning
of the mission,
a factor of about
10 above the
Drift Time (sec)	 Unftnme(sec)
predicted non-
leak value. This	 Figure 3. Torque assessments of Centaur leak with S-S/C ACS off
usage ramped Estimates taken during drift (note different durations plotted) at 19.5 and 26.5 hours after launch
down quickly as
the disturbance to rque decayed rapidly the first couple of days. Within a few days the usage rate was <1 kg/day. By
the end of mission, propellant usage in cruise had shrunk to 0.26 kg/day. To minimize propellant usage, the team
configured the spacecraft to operate with paired thrusters instead of nominal quads. Whereas this helped with fuel
usage, it also removed the cancellation effect of the balanced four-thruster sets, causing all ACS firings to perturb
the LCROSS orbit slightly. The team also increased the ACS impulse bit from 50 ms to 100 ms, thereby improving
the effective specific impulse for typically short thruster firings inherent to cruise mode. Despite the significant
increase in propellant usage compared to a no leak case, the propellant margin associated with the June 18 launch
date was sufficient to make this usage tolerable.
Figure 4. Unexpected Torque changes recorded during cruise
3-axis body rate and attitude error (upper) and 8 thruster outputs (below) all versus time.
Another
behavior
potentially
associated
with
venting
during
flight, was
the apparent
occasional
change in
direction of
the
disturbance
torques,
which
occurred in
discrete
jumps.
Because
these effects
were only
indirectly
observed
through rate
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Figure 5. Doppler results from Cold Side Bake #1
Vertical units are in m/s, where 1 tick is 2 mm/s. The actual bake event occurred over 90
minutes, and total shift in line-of-sight Doppler was 33.5 mm/s.
behavior about each axis, it was never determined if Centaur venting was the cause, or whether there were other
effects in play (such as ice chunks separating from the Centaur) . The plots in figure 4 illustrate a sudden and
pronounced change in the attitude deadbanding behavior (3-axis attitude & body rate plots on top) without
appreciable change in the accumulated thruster pulses (bottom plots). Numerous such events were observed in the
early portion of the mission and continued to occur on a less pronounced scale well after the first five days.
A major lesson learned from the Centaur venting analysis and mitigation process is when flying systems not
designed for extended use, or using launch components well after their design lifetimes, expect to spend extra effort
in the discovery, analysis and planning for newly discovered behaviors. Project teams must investigate all potential
behaviors of the system to be launched and flown to anticipate problem behavior and to develop strategies to
counteract them (via analysis, risk assessment, and operational mitigation strategies). Equally important for this
investigation process will be to find and use potentially advantageous and mission beneficial behaviors and design
operations to take advantage of them.
VI. In Flight Cold Side Bakeout
Water imbedded in the Centaur insulating foam or attached to the surface was a known threat for both science
contamination of the impact site as well as final impact targeting. After S-S/C separation, any significant amount of
water remaining on the Centaur (even if within science requirements) had the capability to significantly alter the
Centaur course. As the Centaur tumbled or rolled prior to impact with no S-S/C control, it would expose its ‘cold
side’ to the sun, and subsequent water outgassing would impart additional vectored thrust, throwing it off target. The
mission operations team mitigation strategy was a pre-emptive and controlled Centaur outgassing maneuver,
performed during the cruise phase of the mission, termed Cold Side Bakeout (CSB). The objective of the maneuver
was to expose the cold, anti-sun side of the Centaur temporarily to the sun with the objective of removing water on
the surface and in the foam. The secondary objective was to either verify no further outgassing was present, or,
estimate the quantity of water remaining. Since escaping water was predicted to cause small spacecraft velocity
changes, precise Doppler measurements taken during CSB maneuvers could also be used to assess whether further
out gassing was needed. As previously noted, ULA estimated up to 1 kg of water may have been embedded in
Centaur foam. One CSB was originally planned, (although planning for subsequent bakes was to be a function of
results from the first). Three CSB’s were actually executed. This resulted in fair, but not complete certainty that
sufficient water had been removed from all portions of the Centaur. These tasks were added to the list of required
mission events and while not a contributor to mission duration, they did add to operations planning, product
development and testing.
Prior to CSB, there were two predictions on CSB effectiveness – one expected virtually no effect of the
maneuvers, under the
theory that water would
be deeply entrained in the
Centaur foam, and that
short exposures of one
hour or less would not be
sufficient to melt and/or
sublimate the water out
of the matrix.	 The
second	 predicted	 a
noticeable response,
perceptible in spacecraft
dynamics in terms of
torque and delta-v. Per
report from Beagle-2
failure review board, it
was postulated that the
sublimation of 50 grams
of ice could perturb a 1-
ton spacecraft by 2.5
mm/s in the anti-sun
direction5 . 	 It	 was
expected that LCROSS
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might see a total perturbation of —1 cm/s, with the acceleration dramatically tapering off towards end of bake.
A. Cold Side Bake No.1
The execution of the first CSB#1 (on DOY 196) rolled the S-S/C & Centaur assembly 180 degrees over 40
minutes, dwelled 60 minutes, and then rolled back to cruise attitude over another 40 minutes to ‘bake’ out water on
the ‘back side’. The primary indication of water outgassing while in CSB and success of the maneuvers upon
completion were changes in spacecraft velocity, derived from Deep Space Network (DSN) Doppler residuals
provided by the Navigation team. CSB #1 results indicated a 3.4 cm/s change in velocity, correlating directly with
the bakeout period (see fig. 5), three times higher than expected. The initial slightly higher rate, may have been a
legitimate change in the outgassing characteristic, or a subtle effect due to the change in direction of the outgassing
vector as the spacecraft rotated. Also, the level of acceleration did not dissipate over the course of the dwell period,
indicating there was likely more water to be released from the Centaur at maneuver completion. The team noticed
- x torques about the X and Z axes
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anti-sun pointing (see fig. 6).
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Figure 6. Attitude Error during Dwell in Cold Side Bakeout #1 	
based on three assumptions: 1)
the cold-side of the Centaur
Three-axis attitude error vs. time showing sticking to deadbands (+/-1.0 deg.) would be exposed to sunlight for
half of the time between separation and impact (—4.5 hours), 2) the separated Centaur was —30% lighter than the
mated flight system, causing accelerations to be larger, and 3) the cold-side material would not appreciably ablate in
that time period, and that no beneficial “cancellation” of perturbation would occur due to fast acceleration transients.
Propellant usage for the first cold-side bake was estimated to be 0.6 to 0.9 kg.
Another result of the first CSB was suspected, but possibly not fully appreciated. On the outbound slew to
bakeout attitude,
 a star tracker (STA) error tripped ACS fault protection and transitioned the STA to Standby Mode.
The operations team postulated
 hat the most probable reason for this event was either water outgassing and
obscuring the STA field of view, or sunlight glinting off of the STA sunshade. A much brighter background would
then result causing an appreciable increase in the STA background count level leading to the STA faulting into
standby mode. No confirmation of these suspected causes was possible, but an increase in STA background count
did re-occur to a lesser degree in each of the next two cold bakes. Two attempts at STA recovery failed while in
bake roll attitude, and telemetry observation of background noise confirmed high levels (> 1200 instrument counts),
indicating continued interference. These levels returned to normal (820 counts) after rolling back to cruise attitude at
the end of the first CSB.
B. Cold Side Bake No.2
Cold Side Bake #2 maneuver was executed on DOY 211 without incident. It consisted of a 10 minute, 180
degree roll to bake attitude, 100 minutes in bake, and another 10 minute slew back to cruise attitude. Based on a
continuation of outgassing at the same level as CSB#1, a hypothetical delta-v for CSB#2 of 5-6 cm/s was estimated.
After accounting for look-in angles between the Earth line of sight and the spacecraft anti-sun vector, the actual
hypothetical delta-v was —1.13 cm/s. Navigation reported that only about 20% of the expected delta-v was observed
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
based on Doppler results, which implied that a knee in the outgassing effects was passed meaning a very effective
first bake and/or additional cook-off of cold-side material occurred for hours or days after Cold Side Bake#1. As a
result, a third bakeout was designed to orient some intermediate surfaces of the Centaur to the sun and confirm
effectiveness of the first two CSB Õ s. The STA background noise level grew from the nominal 820 counts to about
980 counts and then slowly decreased while in bake attitude. Levels returned to normal at completion of the
maneuver. Assessed propellant usage for the second cold -side bake was 1.6 to 1.7 kg.
C. Cold Side Bake No.3
The third bakeout was successfully performed on DOY 267 in conjunction with an antenna test. The maneuver
this time performed a slow roll to 135 degrees and dwelled 20 minutes, then rolled to 225 degrees and dwelled
another 20 minutes, and finally rolled the final 135 deg. back to cruise attitude. Total time for execution was 125
minutes. This allowed the full exterior of the Centaur to be exposed to sunlight for a number of minutes , with the
potential to induce sublimation in 	 (e_-(z- ^c^:,F, 1 N,-,65 ,o o^soz,s ,^o ;o,^^^¢^^z=^!9 (s'a ^0o9_4;a94^
areas where previous CSB Õ s had -cCEI TTO L
not.	 ^" _ ler±sh^ft^
durirrg^ \A duiell	Based on results from CSB#2,	 cC 	 i
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earth angle at the time of the	 - -
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r
would be seen in the Doppler shift,
equivalent to 1.0 mm/s. Due to the	 o ^o
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much	 smaller	 levels	 than	 r mee	 o	 '
experienced with CSB #1 and Figure 7. Processed Doppler effects from Cold Side Bake #3 DOY 267
similar to CSB #2. Thruster	 (Doppler residual freq. vs. time)
perturbations effects however were
on the order of 0.5 to 1.0 mm/s, which inhibited establishing a longer -t m outgassing trend for this activity. The
results (Figure 7) did provide increased confidence in the CSB#2 targeting projections. Total delta -V measured was
1.2mm (with partials of 0.45 mm/s observed while rolled 135°, and 0.13 mm/s observed while rolled 225°), which
also tapered off well towards the end of the maneuver. If the delta-V was anti -Sun, as hypothesized, then the
outgassing acceleration during CSB#3 dwell was 9.2 mm/s/hr. This was larger than the acceleration observed during
CSB#2, and implied that the outgassing delta-V may have been asymmetrical, rather than purely anti-Sun. This
implication was borne out by a 70% reduction in rate of Doppler shift seen during the second dwell, after the
spacecraft had been rotated 90°. The slopes in the Doppler shift during each dwell were relatively flat, implying a
floor in the outgassing performance had potentially been reached. Assuming these perturbations to be applicable for
half of the post-separation time (9.7 hours), the total delta-V would be 3.7 cm/s. For this delta-V, total deflection at
lunar crater target was estimated at 640 meters, and after applying cosine losses to accelerations during Centaur
rotation, the impact deflection was then bounded to be 410 meters. Whereas this was well within the targeting
requirement, a nominal biasing of impact target based on sun location was proposed and applied by the Mission and
Maneuver Design team, with input from the Navigation team. For this maneuver, the STA background noise levels
grew to 852 counts with no STA fault and returned to nominal at maneuver completion. Assessed propellant usage
for CSB #3 was estimated at 0.47kg. Monitoring accumulations of thruster firing 9 hours later, the thruster firing
totals were about 1/3 of what had been occurring, implying that the leakage or off-gassing had gone down noticeably
over the course of the maneuver. Given that the Doppler data from CSB #3 was acquired at a less than ideal angle,
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and indications were that significant outgassing was still possible, the team desired to perform one more cold side
bake. However, due to a previous S-S/C issue there was not enough fuel or time remaining to make another attempt.
Results from these Cold Bake maneuvers validated pre-launch concerns and indicated successful depletion of
remaining moisture from the Centaur vehicle. It is also worth noting that the larger than -expected perturbation
observed during CSB#1 may be an indication that much more then one kg of ice may have been carried to orbit on
the upper stage, which correlates with ULAs predictions of water ice trapped in the foam (~1 kg) plus additional
water ice attached to the surface (more than one kg). These maneuvers also required significant effort from and
exercised all components of the mission operations team. Pre planning for these events was therefore crucial in the
mission operations planning phases.
VII. Thermal Design
Carrying the Centaur for this mission duration complicated pre-launch thermal analysis and in-flight thermal
control of the LCROSS S-S/C. Five factors contributed:, 1) the thermal sink of the large mass, 2) radiative properties
of the Centaur, 3) reflective properties of the Centaur, 4) large potential sun shadow created by the Centaur, and 5)
coatings or surface preparations that could potentially flake or have therm al property changes. Unique concerns
included the thermal characterization of the Centaur’s mating electrical connector capability, life and function of the
separation clampband and potential leak or burst hazard of Centaur batteries while in proximity to the S-S/C solar
array. Note that LCROSS initiated separation of S-S/C and Centaur via the Centaur clampband, which is normally
initiated by the Centaur . Additionally, analysis was performed on the Centaur-payload adapters to identify the best
coatings for the expected thermal environment. While these warrant additional thermal analysis, the LCROSS
design was limited to
what could be afforded
under project Class D	 Thruster Value Temps ,Before (and After:CenfauriSe;paration =
budget constraints. 	 00 `282
	The thermal design	 60.	 -
needed	 to	 -Valve;	 Vawcfr'
accommodate	 these	 r— ` wawe(s" r—"a1vea	 taur;Sep;_ AA
factors with the
Centaur attached to S-
S/C (normal mission
analysis),	 yet	 still
needed	 to	 satisfy
thermal constraints
when the Centaur was
detached for the critical
last 9 + hours of the
mission. LCROSS
suffered from a thermal
control problem that
affected some of its 5
N thrusters4. Whereas
the cause of this
	 aay^urc)
anomaly was not	 Figure 8. Thruster valve temperatures before and after Centaur detach
related to the Centaur,
the Centaur’s proximity to the affected thrusters was expected to influence the thruster valve temp response. This
increased the uncertainty of how the valve temps would respond once the Centaur was released. Hence, there was a
potential operational risk during a critical portion of the mission if further mitigation actions were to be required.
Figure 8 shows S-S/C thruster valve temperatures both before and after Centaur separation indicating the change in
thermal behavior observed. These behaviors did not impact LCROSS operations, but the level of uncertainty about
these changes warrants diligence on future projects.
VIII. Centaur Separation
Operation of the Centaur release mechanism required additional pre-launch analysis and mission operations
design, planning and testing. The Centaur Payload (spacecraft) Release System is designed to separate the spacecraft
from the Centaur as soon as orbit insertion maneuvers have been completed, typically within 1-2 hours of launch.
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The LCROSS project required that the S-S/C and Centaur remain attached, and for this release mechanism to
function properly while in cold space after 112 days. This had never before been attempted with this launch system,
and although an analysis showed that the mechanism would still function, there was no certainty. Significant
analysis was spent on estab lishing the thermal environment at the structure and connectors that needed to disconnect
properly when the Centaur was released. The resulting uncertainty required an operational separation contingency
plan to retry separation from the ground, or fly the mission to completion with the Centaur attached. The
contingency response was designed based on the assumption that the release pins or mechanism might be frozen
(where not exposed to sunlight), and that a roll to expose the cold side (as was done with the Cold Side Bakes) to the
sun might warm the release mechanism sufficiently for a second release attempt to be successful. At the time this
contingency would have to be executed, mission operations would have already transitioned the ACS to ‘detached’
rates in anticipation of a successful separation. The following steps outline the additional mission planning activities
that needed to be anticipated, created and tested prior to flight for this contingency.
1) ACS software flag reset to ‘attached’ (control algorithms based on mass).
2) Stop currently running on board sequence (which assumes successful first separation attempt).
3) Command a new set of quaternions to roll cold side of release mechanism into sun.
4) Roll back to separation attitude and re-send release commands
5) Re-enter nominal procedural step to observe separation attempt results.
6) Time and event planning so that these events could be performed with enough time remaining to
accomplish remainder of mission.
Had both separation attempts failed, mission objectives dictated that the S-S/C and Centaur would impact the
target crater still attached. Even as this may have created a larger impact plume for other observation assets due to
the increased mass of the LCROSS S/C, a significant mission objective would be lost as the onboard science
instruments would not be able to observe the impact. Additionally in this failure mode, there was risk of impact
science measurement contamination due to unused fuel aboard the LCROSS S-S/C now added to the impact site .
IX. Conclusions
The LCROSS spacecraft launched with the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter on June 18, 2009, and on October 9,
2009, after 112 days in flight, the LCROSS S-S/C successfully delivered both the Centaur and itself on-target as
kinetic impactors to the lunar crater Cabeus. The LCROSS project designed, launched with and carried the Centaur
upper stage vehicle for the duration its mission, and experienced unique behaviors associated with that union. Nearly
every phase of this project was impacted by these shepherding considerations. This mission demonstrated one
successful use of a Centaur upper stage as an integral part of a science mission and how many of the unique
challenges in designing and flying such components can be overcome. Future missions will likely find enabling uses
for spent launch vehicle components for cost reduction or as payloads. We expect that some of the specific lessons
learned on LCROSS will also apply to these missions, and that the general approach of early and sustained close
coordination with the launch vehicle provider will be necessary to ensure mission success.
Appendix A
Acronym List
ACS Attitude Control System LRO Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter
CSB Cold Side Bakeout MGA medium gain antenna
ConOps Concept of Operations RCS Reaction Control System
DOY day of year S-S/C Shepherding Spacecraft
DSN Deep Space Network STA star tracker assembly
EDUS Earth Departure Upper State TCM LCROSS Trajectory Correction Maneuver
EELV Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle TLI Trans-Lunar Injection
ESPA EELV Secondary Payload Adaptor ULA United Launch Alliance
LCROSS Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite
LGALRO Lunar Gravity Assist Lunar Return Orbit
LPRP Lunar Precursor Robotic Program
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Appendix B
Glossary
Centaur upper stage Second stage of the Atlas launch vehicle.
Cold-side bakeout Maneuver to expose previously shadowed surfaces to the sun to cook off volatiles
Lunar impactor Vehicle, device or mass used to impact the lunar surface for the purpose of exposing
buried material.
Science data contamination Invalidation of science return do to addition of compromising or diluting materials
Sticky Deadbanding Vehicle attitude observed to drift or move to and stay at attitude deadband limit
Venting unused propellants Release and clearing of any unburned launch or control system fuels.
Water outgassing Release or sublimation of water ice attached to or entrained in component surfaces.
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Agenda 
•  Purpose of this Presentation 
–  Provide a few issues to watch for if and when carrying a second 
stage in space (Centaur in this case) 
•  Describe Mission 
–  LCROSS 
•  Describe applicable Mission Constraints 
–  Site measurements and contamination 
•  Describe three in-flight experiences  
 and results. 
–  Centaur Venting 
–  Cold Bakes 
–  Thermal 
•  Summary 
•  Potential reasons for carrying a  
 second stage on an extended  
 mission: 
–  Impactor 
–  Fabrication/hardware 
–  Asteroid diverter 
•  LCROSS Mission 
–  Objective to carry a Centaur second 
stage to moon, direct it to a target  
crater after 100+ days, release it and observe the impact. 
•  What are some of the issues mission designers and operations 
teams need to deal with.  
–  Is the Centaur space flight ready? 
–  Attitude control at separation (dual ACS modes required) 
–  Release mechanism reliability 
–  Thermal control during mission. 
•  What should you watch out for? 
Purpose of this Presentation 
•  CLASS D (low budget, high risk tolerance), Lunar exploration 
•  Co-launch with Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter on an Atlas V 
launch vehicle using a Centaur second stage. 
LCROSS Mission 
LCROSS Mission 
Mission Objective: 
Advance the Vision for Space 
Exploration by determining 
the possible existence of 
water ice at the lunar poles. 
After 112 days in flight, both 
the Centaur upper stage 
and LCROSS shepherding 
spacecraft (S-S/C) 
completed the mission by 
impacting the moon on 
target in the crater Cabeus. 
LCROSS S/C 
LCROSS made innovative use 
of the Centaur upper stage as a 
primary impactor,  
and the Evolved Expendable Launch 
Vehicle (EELV) Secondary Payload 
Adaptor (ESPA) ring as the shepherding 
spacecraft’s primary structure.  
LRO-LCROSS Launch 
-  LCROSS power on 
sequence at L + 2+ hours. 
-  LCROSS passed control 
at L + 3+ hours. 
The LCROSS mission was 
focused on achieving a 
precise, high-energy Centaur 
impact within a lunar polar 
crater, and observing the 
impact and resulting ejecta 
plume from a combination of 
orbiting and Earth-based 
assets.  To achieve the 
desired impact geometry, 
LCROSS performed a lunar 
gravity assist to transfer from 
its trans-lunar orbit to a Lunar 
Gravity Assist Lunar Return 
Orbit (LGALRO), an elliptical, 
Earth-centered orbit inclined 
steeply with respect to the 
lunar orbit plane.  
LCROSS Orbit 
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Oct 9, 2009 
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June 18, 2009 
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on Aug 17, 2009 
Earth 
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Mission Constraints 
- The Launch System shall vent 
the H2 and O2 tanks to limit the 
remaining combined mass of 
those species to no more than 
100 kg.  
- LCROSS will strive to measure 
the concentration of water in the 
ejecta cloud, as a ratio of water 
ice to regolith, to a level as low 
as 0.5% by mass, and to 
determine the form of which the 
water may be in.  
- LCROSS shall distinguish 
water carried by the impactor 
from water present on the moon 
or provide confidence that any 
residual water from the impactor 
is scientifically insignificant for 
lunar water detection.  
Mission & Constraint Implications 
-  Centaur systems not designed for prolonged 
mission operations. 
-  Centaur propellant systems not designed for 
100% fuel and pressurant depletion, or to be 
contamination free. 
- Propellant fill and vent valves perform well for the 
launch and orbit maneuver activities, but they were 
not designed for 100% closure after the Centaur’s 
task is completed and products vented. 
Mission & Constraint Implications 
-  Centaur materials and insulating foam not 
designed to be contaminant or water free. 
No normal operation designed for removal. 
-  Centaur payload release mechanism not 
designed to function after many days in 
space. Reliability of this function an 
unknown.  
Item #1:  Centaur Leak - Problem 
•  Project assumed a potential for residual propellants to leak 
from one or more valves on the spent Centaur stage for weeks 
or even months following launch.  
•  Any residual fuel still remaining could vent and induce torques 
on the S-S/C and Centaur system. This generated a significant 
risk for LCROSS. 
•  Reliably predicting the amount of S-S/C propellant needed to counteract 
venting disturbance was difficult because of the following: uncertainty in 
the magnitude of the leak rate; direction that the escaping gasses would 
take (depending on number of valves open, their location, and effective 
thrust parameters including leak vector); and the decay time associated 
with such a leak.  
•  Under low and moderate leak rates, analysis showed that the nominal 
control mode designed for the cruise portion of the mission (lasting on 
the order of 100 days) would consume all the propellant (305.5 kg 
launch load) before completing the mission.  
Item #1:  Centaur Leak - Mitigation 
•  Required Operations team to develop a number of operational 
strategies for assessing leak severity and alternate modes of 
operating the vehicle to counteract any leak effects.  
•  Adapting the cruise control gains to work with increased thruster pulse 
width (50ms to 100 ms), increasing the low duty cycle efficiency of the 
pulses. 
•  Changing the thruster selection logic to fire thruster pairs instead of 
quads (fuel savings at expense of orbit determination accuracy). 
•  A new ACS mode entailed spinning the vehicle about its axis of 
maximum inertia with the solar array (vehicle –Y body axis) pointed at 
the sun.  
•  The following two plots show the results from torque 
observations to assess leak effect collected 19.5 and 26.5 
hours after launch. These were made with thruster control 
inactive and show a good drop off in leak torque. 
Item #1:  Centaur Leak - Results 
Item #1:  Centaur Leak - Lessons 
•  These efforts expended significant resources from many 
groups at a time when launch preparations and operations 
tests were in progress.  
•  Risk posed by potential Centaur leak rates influenced the 
decision to slip the LRO/LCROSS launch by two weeks. 
•  Conclusion: 
When flying systems not designed for extended use : 
•  Expect to spend extra effort in the discovery, analysis and planning for 
newly discovered behaviors.  
•  Investigate all potential behaviors of the system to be launched and 
flown as early as possible to anticipate problem behavior and to 
develop and test strategies to counteract them. 
Item #1:  Centaur Leak - Burps 
3-axis body rate and attitude error (upper plots) and 8 thruster outputs 
(below) versus time showing unexpected torque changes during cruise. 
Item #2:  Centaur Water - Problem 
•  Water embedded in the Centaur insulating foam or attached to 
the vehicle surface was a known threat for both science 
contamination of the impact site as well as final impact 
targeting.  
•  As water was the primary science objective, any remaining in or on the 
lunar impactor could significantly interfere with or invalidate science 
conclusions.  
•  After S-S/C separation, any significant amount of water remaining on 
the Centaur (even if within science contamination requirements) had 
the capability to alter the Centaur course prior to impact. As the 
Centaur tumbled or rolled prior to impact with no S-S/C control, it would 
expose its ‘cold side’ to the sun, and subsequent water outgassing 
would impart vectored thrust, throwing it off target.  
•  Per ULA outgassing analysis, there could be ~1 kg of water 
trapped in foam, half of which could be boiled off when cold-
side was exposed to the Sun. 
•  Per same ULA analysis, 90% of this water would bake out within one 
hour of exposure. 
Item #2:  Centaur Water - Mitigation 
•  Analyze and quantify sources of water in and on the Centaur 
stage prior to launch. 
•  Design operational flight procedure to ‘Bake-Out’ water ice 
from the Centaur insulating foam while in cruise. 
•  Expose the cold, anti-sun side of the Centaur temporarily to the sun 
with the objective of removing water on the surface and in the foam. 
•  Verify no further outgassing was present, or, estimate the quantity of 
water remaining based on delta-V and pre-flight estimates. 
•  Use precise Doppler measurements taken during CSB maneuvers to 
assess effectiveness of the maneuvers.  
•  Three Cold-Bakes performed in 73 days 
•  Mixed with other mission tasks and science calibrations. 
•  Each execution was unique in design and result. 
•  Doppler results from first bake on next chart. 
•  Showed good evidence of outgassing, and usable results. 
Item #2:  Cold Side Bake Doppler 
signature (CSB#1) 
Yaw-related 
Antenna motion. 
Roll-related 
Antenna motion 
Post-bake residual, 
Large at ~+33.5 mm/s 
Pre-bake residual,  
nominal at ~-0.5 mm/s 
Yaw-related 
Antenna motion. 
Item #2:  Cold Side Bake Results 
•  For CSB #1, spacecraft velocity shift was ~3.4 cm/s correlating 
directly with the bakeout period, which was three times higher 
than expected. 
–  There was no appreciable change in the rate of change in velocity, 
implying that offgassing material present was extensive and might take 
many hours to deplete.    
–  The transients in the acceleration seemed to be very brief, ie; it did not 
take much time for the dark-side to “warm-up” before seeing an effect 
on the trajectory, and it did not take much to time for the acceleration to 
diminish once it returned to shadow. 
•  Outgassing resulted in all  
 Three axes driving to and  
 ‘sticking’ to attitude  
 deadbands. 
Antenna Motion due to slews Periods in which offgassing can be observed 
Item #2:  Cold Side Bake Signature 
(CSB#2) 
Doppler signature (CSB#2) 
•  Bakeouts determined (to the extent measurable) that Cold Bake 
maneuvers had removed Centaur water. 
•  No residual cooking off of ice seemed to have occurred during cruise 
between CSB#2 and CSB#3 as these two showed similar trends. 
•  ~20% of the expected delta-v was observed on CSB#2, which implied a 
cliff in the outgassing effects was passed and/or additional cookoff of 
cold-side material occurred for hours/days after CSB#1. 
•  Post separation targeting errors, initially large, became 
acceptable after three bakeouts. 
–  The Centaur impactor target error after CSB#1 was at the 1-2 kilometer 
level as determined from Doppler residual data.  (1.75 Km required) 
–  Target error after CSB#2 & #3 was bounded at 410 meters. 
•  Pointing error at impact due to OD was expected to be 0.25 º  
–  When added with other OD error, there was no margin for OD pointing 
error performance.   
–  This was mitigated by nominal braking burn performance and use of 
additional ground station tracking data. 
Item #2:  Centaur Water - Summary 
•  Results from these Cold Bake maneuvers validated pre-launch 
concerns of water contained on the Centaur vehicle and 
resulted in successful depletion of remaining moisture to 
acceptable levels.  
•  Conclusions: 
When flying systems that may require special operations (as in 
anti-contamination maneuvers here) : 
•   These maneuvers required significant effort from and exercised all 
components of the mission operations team.  
•   Pre planning for these events was therefore crucial in the mission 
operations planning and testing phases. 
•   Look for these potential extra mission requirements during operations 
design. 
Item #2:  Centaur Water - Lessons 
Item #3:  Thermal - Problem 
•  Pre-launch thermal analysis (margin accuracy) and in-flight 
thermal control due to: 
•  Thermal sink of the large Centaur mass. 
•  Radiative and reflective properties of the Centaur. 
•  Large potential sun shadow created by the Centaur. 
•  Coatings or surface preparations that could potentially flake or have 
thermal property changes over mission duration.  
•  Other concerns requiring analysis (if possible). 
•  Thermal characterization of the Centaur’s mating electrical connector 
capability. 
•  Life and function of the separation clampband after prolonged cold. 
•  Potential leak or burst hazard of Centaur batteries while in proximity to 
the LCROSS S/C solar array.  
•  Mitigation: 
•  Analyze where and as much as possible.  Develop dynamic model. 
•  Determine behavior in flight and adapt as needed. 
Item #3:  Thermal – Results 
Typical thruster 
valve temps in 
cruise. 
Item #3:  Thermal - Example 
Item #3:  Thermal - Lessons 
•  A good thermal analysis tool and models is required for proper 
performance and minimal surprises. Given class D budget 
constraints, very important to choose where to spend analysis 
effort. 
•  Conclusions: 
When flying systems that may have unique and complicated thermal 
properties: 
•  Determine where to spend thermal analysis efforts to best mitigate your 
largest expected risks. 
•  Do plan for flight operational procedures that can compensate for wide 
variations in thermal response.  
•  Exercise diligence and good risk analysis when determining the level of 
uncertainty of these effects.  
Summary 
•  Future projects may find many different uses for spent upper 
stages as part of their missions. 
•  The LCROSS project was impacted significantly by Centaur 
shepherding considerations.  
•  The unknowns: 
•  How do you make a second stage vehicle and its systems fully compliant with 
your mission requirements & constraints? 
•  Where do you spend your analysis and operations resources? 
•  Back to good basic practices: 
•  Work with (launch) system provider early to determine and analyze risks. 
•  Do exercise good analysis for determining uncertainty and risk. 
•  Look for unique mission requirements resulting from new flight hardware. 
•  Search for and anticipate unique problem behaviors early in design to 
develop and test strategies and flexible flight procedures to counteract them. 
•  Anticipate extra resource allocation needed for design and operation of new, 
unique or unproven space flight systems. 
•  The upper stage system (Centaur in this case) must be part of the project 
design and operations process development. 
‘Cause you never know…… 
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CSB #3, DOY 267 
CSB #2, DOY 211 
Backup Slide – STA Noise 
During Cold-Side Bakes, Star 
Tracker background noise levels 
corresponding to bake attitudes. 
Also noted infrequent but large (~1 deg/sec) spikes in the STA 
rates which appear to be correlated with, but lag, attitude 
changes.  Conjecture is that these may be attributable to 
debris in the STA FOV. 
Backup Slide – STA Spikes 
During Cold-Side Bakes 
